




CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES
-  THE H O NG  KONG CASE IN PERSPECTIYE
Abstract
Bilateral financial linkages between Taiwan and mainland China are developing at 
a retarded pace. Relative to robust flows in the physical sphere, namely, trade and 
(unilateral) investment-parallel move in the sphere of circulation lag substantially be- 
hind. On the surface, this is due to the onerous lack of any official framework accord 
which may legitimize and facilitate banking and financial activities both ways. But the 
real cause is structurally more deep-seated and it defies reasoning from purely econo­
mic perspectives. It is understandable, therefore, that activities that are free from, or 
less intervened by, the visible hand -  the public authority -  or any convention requiring 
mutual consent would perform better. The case is totally different for Hong Kong, for 
with the latter there is no “split” or “conflict” of goals between the goveming body and 
the govemed. In more detail, this short note intends to characterise the current cross- 
Strait financial linkages by drawing reference from the rapidly-integrating PRC-Hong 
Kong counterpart. It is argued that to avoid further losses arising from super- 
inefficiency in the businesses there is an urgent need to bridge the fault lines.
Introduction
The path of evolution of the monetary-financial linkages between Taiwan and main­
land China has two principal dimensions: (a) the cross-Strait clearance of inter-bank
transactions; (b) the presence of banking and fmancial intermediaries in each other’s 
territory of monetary jurisdiction. So far businesses in the two spheres have made per- 
ceptible progress. But the achievements have fallen short of the original expectation of 
the society at large.
Relative to the development of bilateral relations in trade and investment -  the 
latter being unilateral, though, in direction -  the retarded flows of fmancial services are 
disturbing. It is undesirable also from the viewpoint of a healthy functioning of the 
market. The banking system and its intermediaries are supposed to develop hand in 
hand with the business community, therefore an uneąual development implies that the 
banks are losing their customers (to rival competitors on the mainland) and thus it cau- 
ses doubts about the mutually-supportive naturę of the two sectors in ąuestion. On the 
other hand, the comparatively superior performance of the real sector gives no ground 
for complacency either. After all, irrespective of their tangible contributions to a susta- 
ined growth of the Taiwanese economy in generał, and trade surplus with mainland 
China in particular, their performance is sM&optimal at best. There is, admittedly, an 
enormous potential for rehabilitation of the inter-sector flows provided that man-made 
distortions to the cross-Strait rationalisation of industries and manpower are removed. 
On the other hand, being an integral part of the movements of the outlying system, this 
pursuit would end in disaster if it took place without accounting for the rapidly emer- 
ging trends of the global economy, principally the formation of the FTA, regional tra- 
ding blocs, intensifying trade wars (PRC and the U.S. in particular) and so on. It is 
feared that symptoms reflecting this negligence are surfacing.
Without dismissing the significance and thus the impacts of the above on 
Taiwan this paper will focus on the issues of the cross-Strait fmancial linkages only. 
Some thematically related topics are incorporated into the corpus of the analysis 
insofar as they can facilitate reasoning. Section II attributes the main causes under- 
lying the sluggish advance in bilateral relations to a split of goals in the govemment 
policies toward mainland China. In a comparative perspective, Section III distingu- 
ishes the real from the banking monetary-fmancial sector and argues that the unfoun- 
ded political prejudice has unduly suffocated the profit-sąueezed banking sector at 
home. Section IV outlines the contributions of two super-preferential arrangements,
i.e. the CEPA and the inter-bank clearance system,to Hong Kong’s prosperity. The 
concluding section insists that Taiwan may regain its economic strength by simply 
duplicating the Hong Kong model yet without dispensing with her political autonomy.
Selecthe Liberalisation
In theory, save for special considerations (most of them are politically motivated)', the 
market opening policies implemented by any economy or trading bloc are deemed to 
be applicable to all; they are not supposed to apply discriminatively between partners
1 For example, the ILSA (Irati-Libya Sanction Act) enacted by the US Congress affects trade of the Euro- 
pean Union with the Third World countries. See: Trade Policy, General Feature o f  Trade Policy, [in:] Market 
Access Sectoral and Trade Barriers Database, Brussels 2004.
as long as they fulfil the WTO General Obligations. In this case, Taiwan figures as an 
exception with regard to its policies toward China. In accounting for the share of re- 
sponsibility, regretfully, Taipei is less innocuous compared to Beijing, owing primarily 
to its reluctance in removing the bottlenecks that rangę from technical and administra- 
tive distortions to the disarray of multiple policy guidelines towards mainland China.
This reluctance arises, by and large, from a debatable proposition that Ta- 
iwan’s sovereignty may be better preserved by using China as the “world factory” 
while keeping distance from it politically. Rightly or wrongly, from the viewpoint of 
the policy-making apparatus, any move that downgrades Taiwan’s status against 
China is unacceptable. Moreover, any business venture that would risk eroding Ta- 
iwan’s overall economic interest, notably its core industry competitiveness, would 
not be tolerated. Those rule-breaking companies and individuals are subject to penal- 
ties accordingly. This being so sińce the erosion of the Taiwanese economic base 
amounts recognisably to the deterioration of Taipei’s bargaining power versus Beij­
ing. Following this logie, it is generally understood that the ultimate criterion for 
evaluating the merits of enterprises engaged in the cross-Strait business is political in 
naturę, i.e. on top of their market performance. What is paradoxical, the goal of pro- 
fit-seeking enterprises does not necessarily coincide with that of the ruling power 
structure. Hence there is room for conflict! O f those that overtly express discontent 
many stand out already as global players with world-class leadership in selected pro- 
duct lines. Yet being home-grown and vulnerable to bureaucratic as well as legał 
sanctions, they tend to bow to power for fear of retaliations!
It is a different story for the Taiwan-based foreign companies, however. 
Time and again both the European and the U.S. Business Councils in Taiwan have 
spoken on behalf of the MNEs they represent against the tightly-guarded market 
channels linking Taiwan and mainland China. Having exhausted their patience, and 
more seriously, their business opportunities, some MNEs silently shifted their opera- 
tion units or regional headąuarters to Shanghai or Hong Kong instead. The key re- 
ason is self-evident. These multinationals set up their offices in Taiwan in the begin- 
ning practically because it was their original plan to build a bridgehead on the island, 
in order to gain access to a potentially lucrative but not fully-opened mainland mar­
ket. Furthermore, sińce Taiwan’s inhabitants share with China almost identical lin- 
guistic and cultural traditions, foreigners would have shortened their leaming process 
in developing the Chinese market from Taiwan.
The govemment’s reluctance must and can also be viewed from a geopoliti- 
cal perspective. In this context one can draw reference to the dilemma confronting 
Berlin before the unification altered some ąualifications. It has to be admitted, in this 
connection, that there is a long list of differences in mapping the position of Taiwan 
to pre-unified East Germany, but one thing is in common. Taiwan remains one of the 
trump cards of the U.S. in the power game they play with China. Eąually, Japanese 
strategie interest hinges critically upon the way the Taiwan ąuestion is handled.
Foreshadowed in the Washington’s hegemonie intent the Taiwanese 
govemment has not been able to formulate sound policies, especially China policies 
as it were, much as Berlin was circumvented because of the strong Soviet domina-
tion. In this respect, it is not merely economic imitation that counts, the U.S. penetra- 
tion into the Taiwanese social fabric goes as deep and extensive as to embrace higher 
education, the military sphere, technology, not to mention the shaping of the ROC’s 
foreign policies. It is an incontestable fact that Washington is extremely sensitive to, 
and thereby working against, any lessening of the tensions between Taipei and Beijing! 
Despite these, the U.S. are losing their grip as time goes by. Such a reversal of the tide 
is fundamentally due to the sustained and vehement rise of China as a regional, if not 
trans-continental, power and hence it succeeds in effectively diluting the U.S. influence 
worldwide.
Let us proceed to the official linę of the PRC on cross-Strait relations. Eco- 
nomically, Beijing, of course , is more than eager to bridge the fault lines that have 
remained as a result of the catastrophic civil war that ravaged whole China till the 
1950’s. Right at the outset, when Deng Xiaoping embraced the market economy in 
late 1970’s, China started launching a vigorous campaign for an immediate and full- 
scale normalization in Three Linkages: essentially, in direct postał, telecommunica- 
tion and commercial affairs, and direct shipping and air-bome transport. To respond 
in a positive gesture, the ROC nationalist govemment gave a green light in late 1987, 
for the first time sińce withdrawing from mainland China, to the demand for the re- 
patriation of veteran soldiers back to their native hometowns on the mainland. This 
step is significant in the history of the cross-Strait relations because it marked the 
beginning of hostility -  as well as tension -  reducing the possibility of manoeuvre on 
both sides. But the reality sińce then has not always been cheerful. Due to the com- 
plexity of intemal as well as extemal factors tensions have been resuming from time 
to time.
Two Regimes, Disparate Outcome
Having sketched the socio-political background we are coming to the core of the 
subject. I shall begin by setting forth some notions that cali for attention. As shown in 
the subtitle of this section, the term “two regimes” invites interpretation from a co- 
uple of perspectives. One of them distinguishes the real physical economy from that 
of the banking-fmancial services2 insofar as both of them are, to a different degree, 
contributing to the evolving division of labour and specialized production between 
Taiwan and China. At varying speed they themselves are transformed also as a sub- 
sector of the East Asian trading bloc. At the second level, it refers to the way Taiwan 
handles her economic relations with China as against those that are enhancing their 
respective mutual co-operations with China. Hong Kong is the main entity we have 
in mind. With reference to the disparity of approaches in the first perspective the 
outcome differs accordingly. In what follows I shall dwell upon issues of the first 
type.
2 By virtue o f  the usual dichotomy, the secondary and tertiary sectors, respectively.
Seeking to comply with, and at the same time benefiting from the shifting 
trends of regionalization, the ROC govemment has begun to relax control on the 
cross-Strait financial flows sińce the early 1990s. But till now the scope conceived 
for this undertaking has been quite limited and the means resorted to selective. Much 
to the discontent of a sizeable business community the path of the evolution of the 
institutional framework linking Taiwan and mainland China is not entirely encoura- 
ging. This applies by all means more to the financial sector than to sectors in the real 
sphere because manufacturing and trade professionals have been able to bypass the 
official taboos one way or another (i.e. without breaking the laws) in doing business 
involving China. Banks are unable to follow suit virtually because of the absence of 
a framework accord concluded between relevant monetary authorities concemed in 
the first place. Secondly, trading firms have taken advantage of liberalization of the 
Taiwanese economy sińce the early 1980s, including notably the continued rise in the 
official ceiling of the overseas remittance allowed for. To date, any individual in 
Taiwan has been able to remit overseas up to US$5 millions annually. This is not the 
case for the banking sector when it comes to setting up a branch or a representative 
office in mainland China. They have to obtain special permissions from the relevant 
Ministries both in China and Taiwan. Hence, the two sectors in ąuestion have wit- 
nessed disproportionate changes in the lever playing field to such an extent that rela- 
tively to the advance of the prior and increasingly integrated market in trade and 
investment in respect of China, a parallel move in banking and financial services lags 
substantially behind!
In 2004, bilateral trade amounted to US$61.6 billion, accounting for around 
33% of Taiwan’s annual tumover in foreign trade with US$28.3 billion surplus in 
favour of the latter. In the meantime, outbound direct investment targeting the main­
land market stood at a cumulative total of US$43.9 billion, according to official so- 
urces3. These records are impressive, bearing in mind that they started from almost 
nil when the govemment lifted bans on indirect trade links with China back in late 
1980s. In fact, a handsome amount of Taiwan’s manufacturers remain highly com- 
petitive intemationally because they make effective use o f the mainland as the site of 
production and R&D. Some of the high-tech companies reap greater profits than their 
Taiwan-based headąuarters. Numerous pioneering traditional Industries, most of 
them labour- or resource-intensive, have found a second lease of life and developed 
world-class brand names. It is now widely accepted that without access to the Chine- 
se market Taiwanese economy would have been in a dire State.
In contradistinction to the former, as of October 2004, there are merely 7 Tai­
wanese banks which have managed to establish a foothold in China through a prolon- 
ged bureaucratic procedure. The number is much lower than of those from Japan (45) 
and Hong Kong (25). By marking their presence as representative offices only their 
businesses are highly restrictive. Not to mention the fact that there are already 204 
foreign banks that are licensed to operate commercially there, 84 o f them entitled to 
conduct RMB business. At the second tier, a cross-Strait flow of funds is increasing
3 US$ 40.8 billion based on statistics released by the Chinese Ministry o f  Commerce. Unofficial figures 
are quoted to have exceeded US$100 billion.
at an alarming rate but with Iow efficiency whatsoever, regardless of the costs 
involved. The immobile huge banking sector in Taiwan is handicapped on two 
fronts: unable (1) to reap the scalę economy through its tangible presence in China’s 
ballooning Wholesale business; and (2) to fund cash-hungry but out-migrated clients, 
some o f whom are o f superior credit-standing and worth keeping. Worst still, Ta­
iwan’s home market is smali enough to accommodate the fiercely expanding banking 
intermediaries, overbanking as it has often been alluded to. Without consolidation 
their profits are squeezed4. In view of these disparate features the current status of 
Taiwan’s banking sector is quite shaky!
In spite of the differences between sectors in terms of achievements nume- 
rous problems remain. However, they are different for the two regimes we have in 
mind. One of them lies in the recognition that bilateral economic relations are asym- 
metrical: in the case of trade, China has persistently incurred huge deficits against 
Taiwan for decades and that mainlanders so far have not been allowed to invest in 
Taiwan. Trade imbalance is admittedly a cause for concem from the viewpoint of 
Beijing. In principle, it stems from, and reflects, the differences in industry and the 
market structures dispersed alongside the shore of Taiwan Strait. But as long as both 
partners play by the book (e.g. without invoking anti-dumping charges) there is no 
ground for complaint! On the other hand, visible hurdles stand in the way for invest- 
ment which, objectively speaking, the Taiwanese govemment must bear most of the 
brunt5. This is curious notoriously because both Taipei and Beijing are currently 
WTO members; they are bound as a rule to meet the General Obligations arrived at 
in the various Rounds of GATT/WTO. By comparison, in dealing with cross-border 
financial services a categorically different scheme applies. At the multilateral level, 
the power of jurisdiction for performance monitoring and regulation are imposed on 
WTO members by the “Specific Commitments” embodied in the GATS of the Uru- 
guay Round. To this category belong such provisions as “market access”, “national 
treatment”, “transparency”, etc.
Unlike the General Obligations which all WTO members must comply with, 
for any new member there is no need to meet the “commitments” which have not 
been agreed upon during the WTO entry negotiation processes. Clearly, Taipei and 
Beijing have never entered a dialogue as regards how to deal with the issues of cross- 
Strait financial services. As a result, a mutual exposure of intermediaries of financial 
services is out of the ąuestion. What merits special attention is that Taipei’s power 
structure refuses to bypass the “one China principle” -  which Beijing leadership 
considered superfluous in discussing economic issues -  and takes necessary steps to 
reach consensus regarding the means for facilitating trade in financial services. Lo- 
oking ahead, a technical thaw is called for, starting with the agreed MOU for brid- 
ging the fault lines. A peculiar part of this episode is that the two govemments in
4 The banking reform, principally through the consolidation phase-one, has failed up to this very moment. It 
is uncertain as to how it will be carried out in the futurę.
5 For example, in terms of the foreign-funded investment the share o f the Capital originating from China must 
not exceed 20%, according to the “ACT Goveming Relations between Peoples o f the Taiwan Area and mainland 
China” (promulgated and implemented on Sept 18, 1992, abb. ARP). This restriction was removed in the eighth 
revision of the ARP on Sept 14,2004. Instead, a less stiff system based on approval was introduced.
question invariably opted for “open door policies” vis-a-vis the rest of the world in 
due succession! But with regard to bilateral relations, the doors rangę from semi-open 
to “full-closure”. Again, the Taiwanese market is more open to foreigners than to their 
mainland compatriots. Asymmetry arises once again, though it involves a different 
order of magnitude compared to trade.
As a developing economy the case of China, on the other hand, was treated 
with leniency on her application for membership and the terms of meeting WTO 
obligations are more flexible. By contrast to the self-motivated “reform and opening” 
in late 1970’s under Deng Xiaoping, the PRC’s entry into WTO two decades later 
implies an opening by intemational standard. In the sphere of banking and financial 
services the PRC, as a custom area, pledged to gradually open its market. Taiwanese 
banking community is treated on a par with its foreign counterparts in market access 
to China as long as they satisfy the criteria that are applicable uniformly. Notwith- 
standing, considering Taiwan as an integral part of China, in early 1990s Beijing 
enacted special Provisions dealing with business enterprises owned by residents from 
Taiwan on the same basis as those from Hong Kong, Macao and Chinese nationals 
overseas.
It was in 2004 that a dramatic tum started to take hołd o f Hong Kong and 
Macao. With their position as a component part of Greater China, the new scheme 
proves to be highly advantageous to the latter. The outcome is borne out by two do- 
cuments: the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) and the Clearance 
Arrangement (CA). Conceived as a WTO-Plus (TDC, 2004), these arrangements 
outline privileges granted to the two autonomous regions of the PRC which are more 
favourable than can be comprehended with regard to the GSP provided normally by 
developed to developing countries. Moreover, sińce they meant to be unilateral in 
naturę, huge benefits are disproportionately distributed. Hong Kong and Macao busi- 
nesses gain proportionally more than their Chinese counterparts do. In what follows 
I shall outline the main contents of the two documents before going to the rationale 
for its duplicative application in Taiwan.
Hong Kong: The Dual Arrangements
Being one of the three leading financial centres in Asia, Hong Kong is noted for 
market capacity, superefficiency, and prudent supervision in handling both bank and 
non-bank financial business throughout the world. Up till the end of 2004, Hong 
Kong boasted gross banking assets six times its GDP; of the top of 100 banking gro- 
ups in the world 71 of them maintain operation bases in Hong Kong. In addition, 
3,200 MNEs have been attracted to Hong Kong on account of its unparallel geo- 
economic location and promising business potentials emanating from a booming 
Chinese and East Asian economy in the region.
In terms of the volume of either consortium loans (excluding Japan) or fore­
ign exchange transaction Hong Kong ranks third in Asia. In respect of the non-bank 
operations, Hong Kong excels eąually in stock exchange, insurance, venture Capital
development, fund management, etc. It is also a regional clearance centre for both the 
American dollar (sińce 2000) and the Euro (sińce 2002).
The conclusion of the two pacts with Beijing, namely, the Closer Economic 
Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) and Clearance Arrangement (CP), which took 
effect respectively in January and March, 2004, further boosted Hong Kong’s supre- 
macy in comparison to Singapore, its major rival in the region. What are the func- 
tions and the benefits Hong Kong expects to gain by means of these two pacts?
Signed on June 29, 2003, the CEPA contains one formal agreement and six 
Appendices. The original idea was put forward by the Hong Kong Chamber of 
Commerce to Beijing on the grounds that Hong Kong’s location advantage as an 
entrepót to China would suffer because, having acąuired the WTO membership and 
hence a ticket to the world market, Beijing would depend much less on he latter for 
the traditional function it plays. Hong Kong’s economy would be marginalized. The 
anxiety of the Hong Kong’s business circles was received with sympathy and reci- 
procated by a chain of bilateral negotiations which eventually led to the conclusion 
of the so-called WTO-Plus clauses. It was also a timely response from Beijing for, 
having endured the 1998 financial onslaught, Hong Kong’s business confidence 
plummeted.
On the other hand, this move was based on an obvious political motivation. 
Namely, propping up economically this newly-recovered “crown jewel” was consi- 
stent with Beijing’s claim that “one country two systems” works. It has been their 
view that the same model may be applied to Taiwan and yield good results!
The CEPA is labelled WTO-Plus because, in terms of its content, the admit- 
tedly generous package of concessions provided for is unilateral. Through this 
newly-opened venue Hong Kong has everything tangible to gain while Beijing eams 
reputation! Materially, this document covers not only privileges granted to Hong 
Kong in trade, commodities, and services, but also a special market access of a host 
of financial and service industries. However, the whole liberalization process is divi- 
ded into three consecutive phases, dating from 1 January, 2004 till the end of 2006. 
The end of 2006 is also a deadline by which China has committed to fully open her 
financial market to WTO members. For an illustration only, during phase-1 liberali- 
sation, China agreed (1) to apply a “zero import duty” to 374 commodity groups as 
long as Hong Kong commodities meet the “rule of origin” reąuirements; (2) to grant 
18 services industry a preferential access to China’s intemal market; and (3) to lower 
the capital reąuirements and other terms imposed on foreign banks or financial cor- 
porations in setting up a branch or representative offices in China.
As far as the concessions are concemed (3), for example, the minimum C a ­
pital reąuirement is reduced from US$20 billion to US$6 billion, and the minimum 
gestation period for setting up banks of mixed ownership (i.e. mixed with Chinese 
local banks) or financial corporations is reduced from three to two years. Furthermo- 
re, to ąualify for conducting an RMB (i.e. Chinese Yuan) business banks from Hong 
Kong shall wait for only two years instead of three years or longer.
Conceivably, enjoying a lead time two to three years ahead of their non- 
Hong Kong competitors Hong Kong banks are able to consolidate their market posi-
tion and expand with considerable ease. In a similar vein, Hong Kong-based non- 
bank financial organizations are also taken care of with comparable favourable terms 
for both cross-border and the host’s home market business opportunities.
Inter-Bank Clearance: In view of the accord reached between Beijing and the HK 
Autonomous Region (AR), the Clearance Arrangement (CA) is formed of three par- 
ts: (1) the cross-border settlement of accounts and clearance, (2) the payment and 
deposit account business, and (3) banking remittance. To understand the naturę and 
the functions of the CA, it is of importance to bear in mind that under the Basic Law 
(literally the AR’s version of a Constitution) Hong Kong is allowed to keep the legał 
tender of her own Hong Kong Dollar. This arrangement signifies as well as validates 
the supreme order as dictated by “one country two systems”. But in reality both the 
HK dollars and RMB are jointly circulating in the market. On the other hand, the 
RMB circulates only in cash form within the AR as a medium of exchange, not as 
a storę of value and means of payment. In addition, neither of the two is a vehicle 
currency because they are not intemationally convertible. The reason for the co- 
existence of two currencies in one market is trivial: there is a strong demand! The 
RMB was in high demand actually long before the world expected that it would 
appreciate significantly against the US dollar. Other than the demand out of the mo- 
tive of speculation, the transactions demand is the main driving force, i.e. for cross- 
border business, tourism, transfer payment, and, more recently, for acąuiring real 
estates in China.
But it has to be realized that the ultimate determinant giving rise to the incre- 
ased transactions is the fact that Hong Kong’s economy is already fully assimilated 
with mainland China, in particular with the Pearl River delta in southem China and 
the Coastal region. At present Hong Kong is depleted of its manufacturing base as 
a new horizon has emerged in cost-competitive hinterland of China. As a conseąuen- 
ce, the backbone of Hong Kong’s economy has been radically transformed. It is now 
overwhelmingly service-oriented in output composition (accounting for roughly 90% 
of GDP). To highlight the significance, and thus the contributions of the China- 
linkage to Hong Kong’s economy, it is instructive to recall merely that, annually, the 
incoming mainland tourists have already surpassed the 10 million mark, representing 
a good 50% of all tourists together. Tourism is quickly emerging as one of the many 
cash crops of Hong Kong, thanks to the immensely expanding purchasing power of 
the nouveau riche. This is hard to imagine, retrospectively, for at the tum of power 
transfer in 1997 Hong Kong underwent a protracted confidence crisis!
In 2001, the volume of the RMB constantly in circulation in Hong Kong was 
estimated to lie between 50 to 70 billion (Cao, 2003). Nevertheless, there was no 
official body responsible for overseeing and streamlining this financial “outlaw”. 
From the viewpoint of the PRC’s monetary authority -  the People’s Bank of China 
(PBC) -  it is imperative to institute a framework, so as to divert unofficial cross- 
border flows into a more organized money market. Based on the Charters of the 
Provisional AC concluded between the PRC and the Hong Kong in 2003, the follo- 
wing rules are set out: (1) to identify a designated Hong Kong bank for consolidating 
the inter-bank clearance, (2) to defme the terms and conditions for the settlement of
accounts between the designated bank and the participating banks in Hong Kong, (3) 
the designated bank is the sole cross-border clearance window with its counterpart -  
the Shenzhen PBC, (4) the designated bank maintains a suitable amount of the rese- 
rve currency -  in this case both the RMB and the HK dollar -  and surrenders the rest 
to its clearance counterpart, (5) to set up a ceiling under which the depositors are 
allowed to convert and remit daily through local banks, (6) to provide banking servi- 
ces including the Visa, ATM, etc. to the clients; (7) banks qualified to run a RMB 
business in China may accept, within a limit, transfers through the designated cle­
arance bank.
On account of the functions of the provisional CA listed above Hong Kong 
has set up, for the first time sińce 1997, an official network for carrying out routine 
cross-border banking transactions with China. As a result, the once predominant 
“grey market” is downgraded. Yet the scope of business of the banking network is 
rather limited. It caters only for individuals, not for the business community, and 
more precisely, for facilitating consumers’ shopping and the household’s demand for 
opening an RMB deposit account. The huge demand for company finance has not 
entered the agenda. Secondly, the allowable amount of transactions is limited on 
a daily basis: under RMB 20,000 for overseas transfer applicable to deposit account 
holders; under 6,000 RMB for a foreign exchange transaction applicable to non- 
deposit account holder. Thirdly, except for the Shanghai/Shenzhen B-Stock Exchan- 
ge opened for foreigners and the H-Stock Exchange for mainlanders, other forms of 
investments cannot go through the system.
At this stage a cross-border RMB business is still highly selective. It looks 
like a smali window opening on densely-guarded high walls. Many people attribute 
this conservative attitude to Beijing’s concem for monetary and fmancial stability. 
Bearing in mind that the 1997 financial crisis plagued half of the money markets in 
Asia, this concem is of course not groundless. Furthermore, sińce the RMB is not 
a convertible currency and that China has not opened her capital account, it seems 
premature to expect anything else.
Despite these drawbacks financial linkages between the PRC and Hong 
Kong are in place already. Hong Kong can claim success not only in comparison 
with Taiwan but also with other potential regional centres in East Asia. The recent 
progress in Hong Kong’s off-shore banking business in the RMB could yet again 
enhance greatly the competitive position of the AR and cast a serious doubt on the 
development outlook of the Taiwanese banking sector!
Concluding Remarks
With reference to the dual financial linkages with China the records of Taiwan look 
dismal indeed compared with Hong Kong. In the area of bilateral exchange of ban­
king intermediates with PRC, those who have managed to set up representative offi- 
ces through the regular procedures have practically no real function to speak of. The 
application of the Chinese counterparts to access Taiwanese market has so far met
with cool response. It is interesting to note that there are, nevertheless, a handful of 
branch offices owned and operated commercially by Taiwan bankers. As fully- 
licensed banking units or affiliates, they are entitled to conduct normal businesses, 
including the highly profitable RMB business in China. This is so because they did 
not follow the regular time-consuming and bureaucratic path as seen above. Instead, 
they approached the mainland market either as investors or by acquiring CEPA- 
compatible Hong Kong banks. O f course, they are the few exceptional pioneers! 
A great majority of the Taiwanese banking intermediaries are still expecting eventual 
redirection of policies towards Beijing.
On the other hand, in order to facilitate bilateral financial flows within a re­
gular and formalized market framework it is indispensable to lay down, in concrete 
terms, the power of jurisdiction of the respective monetary authorities and the appro- 
priate instruments for cross-Strait mutual supervision of the banking systems. Here- 
with, the formal appellation of the accord to be negotiated between Taipei and Beij­
ing is of little significance. To reduce the presumably unfounded connotations that 
the CEPA is not free from political undertones6 other neutral terms may be evoked 
and employed instead. Essentially, this suggests that it is the real contents of the for­
mal paper that count, and it is not the “phraseology” or “ideology” that matters. In 
short, pending the conclusion of a framework accord Taiwan will not be able to re- 
produce Hong Kong‘s economic success.
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